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Abstract
With a unique data set summarizing the quality of rules-based ﬁscal governance in
EU member states, we show that stronger ﬁscal rules in euro area members reduce
sovereign risk premia, in particular in times of market stress. To do so, we develop
a model of sovereign spreads that are determined by the probability of default in
interaction with the level of risk aversion. Estimation of the model conﬁrms the
central predictions. The legal base of the rules and their enforcement mechanisms
are the most important dimensions of rules-based ﬁscal governance.
Key words: ﬁscal governance, numerical ﬁscal rules, sovereign spreads, sovereign
risk, euro area
JEL classiﬁcation: E43, E62, G12, H60, H63
1 Introduction
Diﬀerences in government bond yields have sharply increased in the euro area.
Part of this increase can be attributed to developments in public debt (von
Hagen et al., 2011) and contingent liabilities related to the banking sector
(Gerlach et al., 2010; Ejsing and Lemke, 2011), both evoked by the economic
crisis. Besides, the price of government bonds evidently reﬂects market con-
ﬁdence in governments' commitment towards sustainable ﬁscal policies. The
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trust of investors in such a commitment may be enhanced by a strong ﬁscal
framework (Fatás, 2010) and the framework may help anchor ﬁscal policy ex-
pectations (Leeper, 2010). Indeed, strengthening national ﬁscal governance is
an important item both of national reform agendas in the euro area 2 and the
economic governance reform at the EU level (European Commission, 2010).
We investigate whether national ﬁscal governance and numerical ﬁscal rules
in particular help contain the interest required on government bonds. Speciﬁ-
cally we propose and test a model of sovereign yield spreads that accounts for
risk aversion. We argue that ﬁscal governance has an impact on the sovereign
yield spreads by reducing the probability of default. This has a twofold non-
linear eﬀect on the sovereign spreads: ﬁrst, it determines the standard risk
premium that compensates for the possibility of default no matter what the
extent of risk aversion is. Second, it determines the variance of the payments
from the risky bond. Markets will ask for a compensation for assuming the
risk associated with this variance; this second component is ampliﬁed with risk
aversion. Using a unique dataset on ﬁscal governance in EU member states,
we provide empirical support to our model and speciﬁcally to the restrictions
implied by it. We ﬁnd strong and economically sizeable eﬀects of the quality of
national rules-based ﬁscal governance on sovereign spreads. We further show
that the legal base of the rules appears to be the most important dimension of
their eﬀectiveness in containing sovereign risk premia, while the mechanisms
to enforce compliance are highly important as well. The type of the bodies
in charge of supervising compliance with the ﬁscal rules, in turn, appears to
matter less.
Numerical ﬁscal rules are deﬁned as permanent constraints on summary in-
dicators of ﬁscal performance, such as the budget deﬁcit, debt, or a major
component thereof (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). They are aimed at reducing
the policy failures due to which budget process outcomes tend to be biased
towards deﬁcits: namely, the common pool problem of governments without
centralised spending powers, the short-term orientation of governments due to
short electoral cycles, and the possible short-term orientation of voters. In the
EU, ﬁscal rules further aim at mitigating the incentives for deﬁcits resulting
from a common currency.
Empirical research in the past two decades has shed light on the role of numer-
2 Germany has recently introduced a constitutional rule to limit government debt;
other countries - Hungary, Spain, Portugal, and most recently, Italy - have followed
suit or are contemplating doing so. After initially embracing this idea, the introduc-
tion of a constitutional debt brake has been postponed in France.
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ical ﬁscal rules for sound public ﬁnance. While earlier research concentrated
on the experience of the US states, sometimes in view of deducting insights for
the nascent EMU (von Hagen, 1991; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995; Alesina
and Bayoumi, 1996; Bohn and Inman, 1996), the focus of analysis then shifted
to Europe. The eﬀectiveness of national ﬁscal rules with respect to ﬁscal per-
formance has been shown to depend on the mechanisms established to enforce
compliance with the rule (Inman, 1998; Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2009) and on the
type of the rule: budget balance and debt rules appear to outperform expendi-
ture rules (Debrun et al., 2008) and in fulﬁlling medium-term ﬁscal plans pre-
sented in the Stability and Convergence Programmes of EU members, which
is a central plank of EU budgetary surveillance (von Hagen, 2010). The role
of ﬁscal rules in the budgetary process has been scrutinised as well: empirical
evidence is not fully conclusive whether ﬁscal rules serve as commitment de-
vices to eﬀectively tie the hands of governments not to pursue short-sighted
and pro-cyclical budgetary policies (Debrun and Kumar, 2007b; Debrun et al.,
2008), or whether they merely have a signalling role and remove information
asymmetries between governments and the electorate, without changing the
behaviour of governments (Debrun and Kumar, 2007a; Debrun, 2006). On the
EU level, ﬁscal rules have been shown to be eﬀective, but to lead to signiﬁcant
creative accounting aimed at their circumvention (von Hagen and Wolﬀ, 2006;
Buti et al., 2007). Theoretically, it has been elaborated that supra-national
rules are welfare improving relative to merely national regimes, but that they
cannot fully eliminate the deﬁcit bias, which calls for strong national rules in
addition to the supra-national ones (Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2010).
The past several years witnessed a surge of research on the impact of ﬁscal vari-
ables on spreads in government bond yields as well. In an international context,
a positive relationship between public debt and interest rates has been consis-
tently conﬁrmed (Edwards, 1986; Alexander and Anker, 1997; Lemmen and
Goodhart, 1999; Lonning, 2000; Copeland and Jones, 2001; Codogno et al.,
2003). In the euro area, sovereign spreads are found to be determined by debt,
deﬁcits, and debt-service ratios (Bernoth et al., 2004) as well as by hidden
ﬁscal policy activity, creative accounting practices, and transparency of gov-
ernment budgeting (Bernoth and Wolﬀ, 2008). On the sub-national level, the
price of public debt is conﬁrmed to reﬂect ﬁscal fundamentals (Schuknecht
et al., 2009; Heppke-Falk and Wolﬀ, 2008; Schulz and Wolﬀ, 2009). The im-
pact of risk perceptions has also received signiﬁcant attention by important
research (Codogno et al., 2003; Favero et al., 1997; Barrios et al., 2009) and
more recent research has looked into variations in time in the weight of various
determinants (Bernoth and Erdogan, 2010).
The impact of ﬁscal restraints on the cost of public borrowing has been stud-
ied by looking at US states. Bayoumi et al. (1995) show that the impact of
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constitutional controls on the cost of debt depends on the level of debt: at
average levels, the presence of such controls is found to be associated with a
reduction of the interest cost by 50 basis points. Eichengreen and Bayoumi
(1994) conﬁrm the negative impact of ﬁscal rules on the cost of government
borrowing. Poterba and Rueben (1999) uncover that expenditure, deﬁcit, and
debt rules (negatively) as well as tax limitations (positively) impact on state
bond yield diﬀerentials; debt rules appear to be the least eﬀective. Diﬀeren-
tiating this result, Johnson and Kriz (2005) show that revenue limits have a
direct impact on state borrowing, while the eﬀect of numerical ﬁscal rules is
indirect via improved credit ratings. For the euro area, Hallerberg and Wolﬀ
(2008) reveal that government bond yields are also determined by institutional
characteristics of the ﬁscal process.
Our analysis adds to the body of research in several respects: it is the ﬁrst to
empirically investigate the role of numerical ﬁscal rules to contain sovereign
bond spreads in the euro area speciﬁcally, using a rich dataset maintained by
the European Commission. It does so in a theory framework that accounts for
risk aversion. Speciﬁcally, our model implies that the impact of ﬁscal rules on
sovereign spreads is ampliﬁed by risk aversion; its predictions are conﬁrmed
by the empirical analysis. The impact of ﬁve dimensions of rules-based ﬁscal
governance on sovereign spreads is also investigated separately: the legal base
of the rules and the mechanisms to foster compliance are found particularly
important.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our
analytical approach and the empirical strategy adopted. Section 3 describes
our dataset and the construction of the ﬁscal rule index in particular. Section
4 presents the panel data estimations and a set of robustness checks. Section
5 concludes.
2 Theory and empirical approach
We investigate the impact of rules-based ﬁscal governance on risk premia in
euro area government bond markets in a simple framework allowing for diﬀer-
ent attitudes towards risk. Speciﬁcally, an investor has an amount of wealth
of 1 that she might use to acquire a risk-free bond that pays interest v∗, or
alternatively hold a bond of country i that delivers repayment with interest
amounting to 1 + v∗ + vi, but that might default on its debt with proba-
bility i ∈ [0; 1]. Against the alternative of holding the asset with zero risk,
the sovereign bond of country i will deliver expected additional wealth of
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E(Ii) = −(1+ v∗)θi+(1− θi)vi. We assume E(Ii) = 0: purchasing country i's
sovereign bonds is actuarially neutral. This implies for the compensation for
the possible event of default:
vi = (1 + v
∗)
θi
1− θi = (1 + v
∗)τi, (1)
where τi = (θi)/(1− θi) is the odds of default.
We further assume that investors' utility functions are twice diﬀerentiable
and strictly increasing, i.e. U ′(X) > 0. Risk-averse investors speciﬁcally have
concave utility functions, i.e. U ′′(X) < 0. From the condition of indiﬀerence
between purchasing bonds of country i and the certainty equivalent to such
activity, the Arrow-Pratt measure of the risk premium i can be established
as 3
pii = 0.5σ
2
i ρ, (2)
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, and σ2i is the variance of
outcomes from holding country i's sovereign bonds. The variance, in turn, is
σ2i ≡ E(I2i )− E2(Ii) = τi(−(1 + v∗))2 + (1− τi)v2i = (1 + v∗)2τi. (3)
The risk premium switches signs with the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and is
zero in the presence of risk neutrality.
To risk-averse investors, the sovereign bond of country i has to oﬀer an overall
excess return si over v
∗ of vi (this part is to compensate for the possibility
of default) topped up by the risk premium pii (which is to compensate for
accepting the risk). Using expressions (1), (2), and (3), si becomes
si = vi+0.5σ
2
i ρ = (1+v
∗)τi+0.5(1+v∗)
2
τiρ = (1+v
∗)τi[1+0.5ρ(1+v∗)]. (4)
Equation (4) shows how the excess yield that country i's sovereign bond of-
fers over the risk-free return v∗ depends on the probability of default, θi and
more precisely the odds of default τi, which is a nonlinear function of θi. In
particular, τi has an immediate eﬀect via the compensation for the possibility
of default, vi, as well as an eﬀect via the Arrow-Pratt risk premium, that is in
fact ampliﬁed by the level of risk aversion as well as by the level of risk-free
3 Speciﬁcally, with the amount of wealth of 1 to invest, the risk premium that makes
the investor indiﬀerent between purchasing bonds of country i and the certainty
equivalent to such activity has to satisfy the equality E[U(1 + Ii)] = U [1 +E(Ii)−
pii(1, Ii)]. From here, expression (2) is obtained from applying Taylor approximations
to both sides of the above indiﬀernce condition, using E(Ii) = 0 and E(I
2
i ) = σ
2
i ,
and solving for the risk premium (Copeland et al., 2005).
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return, v∗. 4
As concerns risk aversion speciﬁcally, ∂2si/∂θi∂ρ = 0.5(1− θi)2 > 0: the yield
spread increases with risk aversion especially in countries with higher default
probabilities. For risk neutrality, equation (4) simpliﬁes to the standard ap-
proximation equalising the yield spread with the country-speciﬁc probability
of default: si ≈ τi.
To arrive at our estimating equation, we resort to the standard assumption
(Edwards, 1986; Bayoumi et al., 1995, e.g.) that θi is a logistic function of a
measure Yi that in turn linearly depends on a set of exogenous regressors Xi,
parameters β, and a stochastic error term  ∼ i.i.d.:
θi = P (I = (1 + v
∗)|Yi) = eYi/(1 + eYi) (5)
with Yi = X
′
iβ + εi.
Inserting (5) into (4), taking logs, and rearranging terms results in
ln(si) = v
∗ +X ′iβ + ln(1 + 0.5ρ(1 + v
∗)) + ε′i (6)
As concerns the determinants of the risk of country i's default, these include
the standard determinants of the sovereign debtor's solvency, speciﬁcally, the
actual levels of debt Bi and the budget balance bi, as well as institutional char-
acteristics of the country (Ci, Zi,t), where Ci summarises such characteristics
that are constant over time, and Zi,t is a vector of time-varying character-
istics. The solvency of the country will be determined by the future realisa-
tions of the budget balance above all; but any systematic bias (such as the
deﬁcit bias) of the future ﬁscal position will be already absorbed by Ci, i.e.
Et(bt+1|ci) = γci + νi,t with E(νi) = 0, where ci is part of Ci and cannot be
separately identiﬁed econometrically. Hence, the set of determinants of the
default probability is
Xi,t = (Bi,t, bi,t, Ci, Zi,t). (7)
In our approach, rules-based ﬁscal governance has an impact on sovereign
spreads as part of the institutional characteristics Zi,t, and as such, by having
an impact on the expected probability of default. Fiscal rules can be thought
of as aﬀecting the expected probability of default in two ways. First, their very
4 Dependence from the initial level of wealth (i.e. the amount to invest) of the
measure of absolute risk aversion employed in our analysis does not impair our
results as we disregard of heterogeneity among investors.
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role is to correct for persistent deﬁcit bias, thus improving the expected value
of the ﬁscal balance. Second, they can be expected to reduce the variance of
expected future deﬁcits as well. This diminishes the probability of default as
sustainability-threatening deﬁcits become less frequent. In our model, all de-
terminants of the default probability have a non-linear impact on the sovereign
bond spreads. Calculating back from (6) formulated in logarithms to the levels
shows that their impact is ampliﬁed by the level of risk aversion ρ. In other
words, diﬀerences in the quality of rules-based ﬁscal governance translate into
higher diﬀerences in sovereign spreads when risk aversion is high. But better
rules-based ﬁscal governance will result in lower sovereign spreads at low levels
of risk aversion as well.
In line with the above discussion, in our empirical analysis we regress the log-
arithm of the euro area countries' sovereign bond spreads, ln_spread, against
Germany on the levels of the German Bunds' interest (yield_de), the budget
balance (balance), debt (debt), a measure of the quality of rules-based ﬁscal
governance (fri), and the logarithm of the composite term (1 + 0.5(1 + v∗))
as implied in (6), ln_riskav, where ρ is proxied by the spread between US
low grade corporate and government bonds or the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Market volatility index known as VIX (vix), which is driven by
global shocks and can be considered exogenous to euro area bond spreads.
Our baseline estimating equation thus becomes
ln(spread i,t) = β1yield_det + β2balance i,t + β3debt i,t + β4fri i,t
+ β5ln(1 + 0.5ρt(1 + yield_det)) + Ci + ui,t. (8)
Note that our model implies that β1 = β5 = 1 (see equation (6)).
The ﬁscal rules index fri is described in detail in the next section. Fiscal rules
can be considered exogenous or predetermined to government bond yields.
The endogeneity of ﬁscal rules with respect to ﬁscal policy outcomes has been
explored in empirical research (e.g., Debrun and Kumar (2007a,b)). While
certainly at present, national ﬁscal framework reform debates are driven by
the consolidation pressures and high sovereign bond spreads, changes in ﬁscal
governance prior to this crisis have not been connected with bond markets.
Indeed, government bond spreads across euro area countries had been too low
to fuel institutional debates. Fiscal framework reforms were enacted because
of domestic and EU level pressure instead and endogeneity should thus not
be an issue. Still, to be sure that our results are not impaired by endogeneity
concerns, we check the robustness of our results by excluding the 2009 and
2008 data where the strength of numerical ﬁscal rules might have been deter-
mined by the fanning out of the government bonds yields in the previous year.
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We also present estimation results where the ﬁscal rule index is considered
predetermined.
It has been hypothesised that ﬁscal rules might only be a signal of pre-
existing commitment instead of providing genuine constraints to ﬁscal be-
haviour. Econometrically, our ﬁscal rule index might not measure the eﬀect of
rules-based ﬁscal governance on probabilities of sovereign default by directly
constraining ﬁscal activity, but rather capture an omitted variable measur-
ing pre-existing commitment to sound ﬁscal policies. As we control for coun-
try ﬁxed eﬀects, any omitted variable bias can only stem from time-varying
commitment to ﬁscal rectitude that is correlated with changes in rules-based
ﬁscal governance. In the presence of such omitted variable bias, changes in
ﬁscal rules would reﬂect changes in underlying preferences. Empirically, we
cannot exclude this possibility but it appears to be of comparatively minor
relevance as preferences typically shift only slowly. In any case, if ﬁscal rules
are introduced or strengthened, this happens in the circumstances in which
policy-makers want to reduce the deﬁcit bias. Even if such determination is
present among ﬁscal policy makers, ﬁscal rules will have a role of co-ordinating
behaviour (Drazen, 2002; Weingast, 2005), which goes beyond the role of mere
signalling.
Our baseline regressions are augmented by further analysis. We do not only
consider the global impact of rules-based ﬁscal governance on sovereign risk
premia but study the impact of its diﬀerent dimensions, including the legal
basis, enforcement etc. Besides we provide robustness analyses with regard to
the time period covered, the crisis, and the role of liabilities stemming from
bank rescue operations.
3 The dataset
Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset covering 11 euro area countries
in the time period of 1999 to 2009. We disregard of the most recent years
as 2010 saw more intensive discussions about strengthening rules-based ﬁscal
governance in several euro area countries in the aftermath of the economic and
ﬁnancial crisis. By leaving data of 2010 and 2011 aside, we reduce concerns
about the endogeneity of ﬁscal rules. Luxembourg - with very little public
debt until recently - as well as the latest euro area entrants Cyprus, Malta,
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic are not included either. The sovereign bond
spreads are expressed in diﬀerences to German data, which leaves us with a
panel dataset of 10 countries. Germany is chosen as the benchmark country
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as the Bund is considered the benchmark bond in the respective bond market
(see e.g. Dunne et al. (2007)).
Our dependent variable ln_spread is the log of government bond spread
against the German Bund of the above euro area members based on the yield
of their 10-year on-the-run ﬁxed coupon bonds obtained from Bloomberg. As
an indicator of the debtors' repayment capacity - balance and debt - data
on government debt and deﬁcits from Eurostat are employed. The data are
measured in per cent of GDP. Annual averages of the seven-to-ten year US
corporate bond spread for the rating category BBB from Merrill Lynch against
US treasuries is employed as a proxy for average coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion among investors.
An innovative element of our research is the inclusion of the index of the
strength of numerical ﬁscal rules fri at country level among the regressors.
This ﬁscal rule index has been constructed by the ﬁscal governance unit of
the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Aﬀairs from information on ﬁscal governance obtained from the EU member
states via the Economic Policy Committee of the Ecoﬁn Council of the EU. 5
The ﬁscal rule index is based on information on ﬁve dimensions describing each
ﬁscal rule in force at the local, sub-national or national level in an EU member
state: (1) the statutory base of the rule, (2) room for revising objectives, (3)
mechanisms of monitoring compliance with and enforcement of the rule, (4)
the existence of pre-deﬁned enforcement mechanisms, and (5) media visibility
of the rule. According to a pre-deﬁned scale distinguishing diﬀerent degrees
by which the design of the rule supports its strength along these dimensions,
scores are attributed to each of the dimensions for each ﬁscal rule as shown
in Appendix A. To construct the ﬁscal rule index, these scores are aggregated
using weights obtained as averages of 10,000 randomly drawn numbers from a
uniform distribution, following the method used by Sutherland et al. (2005).
The random weights technique is applied because of the absence of theoret-
ical guidance on the importance of each criterion in the composite index of
the strength of ﬁscal rules. Finally, the indices of the strength of a ﬁscal rule
obtained for each single rule are aggregated to a single comprehensive score
per country per year by adding up the indices calculated for each ﬁscal rule
separately, adjusted by the coverage of general government ﬁnances by that
rule. In the presence of more than one rule covering the same government
5 This rich dataset is updated annually; it is accessible to the public at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/
index_en.htm.
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sub-sector, the second and third rules obtain weights 1
2
and 1/3 to reﬂect de-
creasing marginal beneﬁt of multiple rules applying to the same sub-sector
of general government. The design of the index is inspired by Deroose et al.
(2006). The index is re-scaled to assume values between 0 (minimum) and 10
(maximum). An improvement of the index is achieved by strengthening one
or several existing numerical ﬁscal rules along either of the above dimensions,
by introducing new numerical ﬁscal rules, or by extending the coverage of
general government by existing or new rules. Note that the ﬁscal rule index
only considers if there is a numerical constraint to a budgetary aggregate: it
does not take into account however if this constraint is realistically binding in
reality (e.g., debt rules allowing for a comparatively high debt level are not
binding in low-debt countries).
We also analyse the impact of numerical ﬁscal rules on sovereign bond spreads
considering the ﬁve above components separately. To this end we apply the
same technique of aggregation as for the composite index. Obviously, no
weighting is involved in obtaining this set of sub-indices. Table A in Appendix
B shows the unconditional correlation between the components of the global
ﬁscal rule index: correlations between pairs of components are typically high.
Country sets of rules that are strong by one dimension tend to be strong along
other dimensions as well. The correlation between components 1 and 3 of the
overall index (referring to the legal base and the body in charge of monitoring
and enforcing compliance with the rule respectively) appear to be particular
strong. Components 4 and 5 of the overall index (referring to its enforcement
mechanisms and media visibility) appear to be less connected to the overall
index than components 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows the development of rules based ﬁscal governance in the eleven
euro area members of our sample, as measured by the ﬁscal rules index, 1999
to 2009. The strength of the ﬁscal rules in force in our country of reference,
Germany, has been above average and constant at around 7 throughout the
period considered. 6
The strength of the numerical ﬁscal rules in force in the other euro area coun-
6 In the period covered by our sample, Germany has operated "golden" budget
balance rules and rules limiting nominal expenditure growth for both the federal
government; local governments' budgets have been constrained by debt ceilings and a
balance budget rule. In the period considered, the target of the nominal expenditure
rule was reformulated, that had no impact on the score of the ﬁscal rule index,
though. Note that the much-debated "debt brake" for the federal government and
the Länder will be phased in only from 2011, so the score of the index is unaﬀected
in our sample.
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tries ranged between zero (for Greece, that has had no such rule in force) and
9.5 (the Netherlands, 7 unchanged, and Spain as from 2006) and 9.7 (Spain 8
2003-2005) respectively. Countries with below-average ﬁscal rule index scores
were Ireland, Portugal, and Italy, while the scores of France, Austria, Belgium,
and Finland qualiﬁed these countries as having stronger ﬁscal rules than on
average. Remarkable changes to the better occurred in the case of France 2006
and 2008 to 2009, 9 as well as Ireland 2004, while the strength of the ﬁscal
rules deteriorated in Finland after 2007 and in Austria in 2009, 10 in particu-
lar due to the suspension of rules in force in the course of the economic and
ﬁnancial crisis.
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Fig. 1: The ﬁscal rule index in 11 euro area members, 1999 to 2009
As any index, the index of rules-based ﬁscal governance applied in our analysis
7 The Netherlands have been operating a real expenditure ceiling and a rule to
allocate windfall revenues applying to all general government.
8 Until 2002, Spain has operated debt ceilings to local and regional governments. In
2002, a budget-balance rule covering all general government was introduced, which
was slightly modiﬁed in 2006. In 2003, the rules-based framework was extended by
further restrictions on debt applied to regional governments.
9 In 2006, France introduced a rule to the central government to pre-commit unex-
pected revenues, and a ceiling to the growth of health expenditure to be established
by the parliament. In 2008 the increase of social security debt was made condi-
tional upon an increase in revenues. Finally, since 2009, unexpected revenues were
automatically assigned to deﬁcit reduction.
10 In Finland, a debt rule and budget balance rule applied to the central government
were no longer in force after 2007 and 2008, respectively. In Austria, the budget
balance rule laid down in the National Stability Pact was replaced in 2009 by a
nominal expenditure ceiling for ﬁve headings of the general government budget.
The main diﬀerence between the two approaches is that the more recent nominal
expenditure ceiling only covers a fraction of parts of the budget previously covered
by the National Stability Pact.
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constitutes a simpliﬁcation of complex reality. Despite measurement errors of
which an index of this type will inevitably suﬀer, we argue that it is a useful
approximation of reality. Measurement errors aﬀecting the index should be
randomly distributed and therefore not aﬀect the basic estimation results. If
anything, attenuation due to measurement errors biases coeﬃcients towards
zero. Therefore, any signiﬁcant result can be conﬁdently regarded to corrobo-
rate our hypothesis and provide a lower bound of the true eﬀect.
Turning now to the development of the government bond spreads as compared
to German Bund yields in the period under review, these spreads were below
30 basis points for most euro area members, with a slight increase until 2001
and decreasing in the period between 2001 and 2006. Sovereign bond spreads
mounted and fanned out in the wake of the economic and ﬁnancial crisis, with
particularly high values of 190 basis points reached on average by Greece and
Ireland and values between 40 and 100 basis points for the other euro area
members during 2009 (see Figure 2). The ranking of the euro area members
by the size of the spread of their bond yields against Germany was broadly
constant in the period considered, with France, the Netherlands, and Finland
being closer to the benchmark and Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain being at
the higher end of the distribution.
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Fig. 2: Sovereign spreads against Bunds in 10 euro area members, 1999 to 2009
In Figure 3 we look at the development of international risk aversion as mea-
sured by the spread between low-grade US corporate and government bonds.
As can be seen by comparison with Figure 2, euro area government bond
spreads have moved in parallel with international risk aversion. In fact, inter-
national risk aversion was particularly low in the mid-2000s, when euro area
sovereign bond spreads were historically low as well. With the rise of interna-
tional risk aversion during the economic and ﬁnancial crisis, sovereign bond
spreads increased markedly, too.
12
0100
200
300
400
500
600
700
b
a
s
i s
 p
o
i n
t s
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Fig. 3: Merrill Lynch US corporate BBB spread, 1999 to 2009
Table B in Appendix B provides the simple correlations of the main variables
applied in our analysis. The unconditional correlation between the quality of
ﬁscal rules and the sovereign bond spreads in our sample is negative.
4 Estimation results
We carry out the empirical estimation of the model outlined in section 2 in
a dynamic framework using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. As we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant error autorcorrelation when using a static approach, we prefer to
show this dynamic estimator. A dynamic model with two lags is found most
appropriate according to the standard tests. The chosen GMM estimator ac-
counts for the potential endogeneity in the level of general government debt,
the budget balance, and the level of risk aversion.
Table 1 presents the main results of the estimation of our model. Regression
A presents the estimation of our model according to equation 9 above (see
section 2). The negative eﬀect of the strength of rules-based ﬁscal governance
on sovereign spreads is clearly conﬁrmed. An increase in the index thus results
in a reduction of the sovereign spread relative to Germany.
A unit improvement of the rules-based framework lowers the risk premium
by around 23 per cent. Due to the log-linearity of our model, the eﬀect on
absolute spreads of a change in one determinant depends on the level of the
other variables. When the level of risk aversion is high, improving national
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rules-based ﬁscal governance will have a much stronger eﬀect on sovereign
spreads than in times of lower risk aversion. Likewise, a unit increase in the
quality of ﬁscal governance induces a larger decrease of the sovereign spread
in a country with higher deﬁcits and public debt. Figure 4 illustrates this
dependency. As can be seen, the higher the level of risk aversion, the steeper
the slope of the curve relating the sovereign spread to the quality of rules-based
ﬁscal governance (left panel). At the same time, initial spreads are higher and
their decline is consequently higher if deﬁcit and debt are high (right panel). In
sum, the beneﬁt from improving rules-based ﬁscal governance will be highest
for countries with weaker budgetary positions and in times of higher risk
aversion.
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Fig. 4: Sovereign spreads at diﬀerent values of the ﬁscal rule index and risk
aversion, (a) sample average and (b) high-deﬁcit, high-debt example
The eﬀects of the other variables are as expected as well. Sovereign spreads
of the euro area countries in the 2000-2009 decade is above all determined by
the risk-free interest rate and the level of global risk aversion. Increasing the
benchmark interest rate by one percentage point leads to a one percent in-
crease of the spread. A reduction in the general government budget deﬁcit by
one percentage point results in a decrease of the spread by around 20 per cent,
while each percentage point of additional general government debt increases
the spread by around two per cent.
Importantly, our estimation results conﬁrm the restrictions of our model:
speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of unity to ln_riskav and yield_de cannot be re-
jected. The model thus appears to be in line with the data generating process.
In regressions B to D reported in Table 1 we add further control variables to
our basic speciﬁcation. Regression B adds the bank assets to GDP ratio as
15
a further control variable. The regression reveals that countries with larger
banking sectors typically see larger spreads, conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Ger-
lach et al. (2010). In regression C we include the net borrowing of the entire
economy as well as the total net ﬁnancial liability position of the economy.
We ﬁnd that larger liability positions are associated with higher spreads but
net borrowing is not found to be signiﬁcant. This result holds up in regression
D, in which all variables are included simultaneously.
In regressions E and F reported in Table 1, we investigate the robustness of
our ﬁndings to the time period. Speciﬁcally, we shorten the sample by one and
two years respectively to exclude the crisis years. Thereby we can avoid our
results being purely driven by the last couple of crisis years. The shortened
sample is also a way of addressing potential endogeneity concerns, given our
argument that prior to the crisis, ﬁscal governance was not shaped by concerns
about sovereign spreads. The regressions presented document the substantial
robustness of our results. The coeﬃcient on our ﬁscal rule index is highly sig-
niﬁcant in the pre-crisis years as well, and its magnitude is very similar to
that found with the full sample. We are thus conﬁdent that our results are not
driven by recent crisis volatility and that our ﬁndings are not impaired by the
endogeneity of rules-based ﬁscal governance quality with respect to sovereign
spreads.
Regression G adds further to the investigation of endogeneity: here we con-
sider fri to be predetermined. These results conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings; we
obtain a stronger eﬀect of the ﬁscal rule index.
The ﬁnal columns of Table 1 present regressions where we depart from the dy-
namic model, in order to document the robustness of our results to diﬀerent
estimation approaches (regressions I to K). Our central results are again con-
ﬁrmed; all variables keep their sign and their signiﬁcance. The static approach
is also better suited to testing the robustness of our results to potential liquid-
ity eﬀects that might aﬀect sovereign spreads. Speciﬁcally, on bid-ask spreads
that are conventionally employed to proxy liquidity in sovereign bond mar-
kets, we only have data as of 2003 at our disposal, which renders our dataset
unsuited to estimating a dynamic model with several lags of the dependent
variable. Regression J shows that higher bid-ask spreads, that are a sign of low
liquidity, are associated with higher sovereign spreads. The euro area countries
where the strength of rules-based ﬁscal governance was below the average of
5 in 2009 were Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal; of these, the last
four are facing particularly high consolidation pressures. According to the pre-
dictions of our model, these countries would have proﬁted most from improving
their rules-based ﬁscal governance. The results from regression A presented in
16
Table 1 for the year 2009 - when global risk aversion was particularly high -
imply the following: in the case of Greece - with a budget deﬁcit of 13.5 per
cent and a public debt burden of 115 per cent of GDP - the establishment of a
rules-based ﬁscal governance framework of average quality would have implied
a reduction of the sovereign spread by around 130 basis points. Ireland also
had a budget deﬁcit of 14 per cent in 2009 but public debt only amounted to 63
per cent of GDP; while its rules based ﬁscal governance framework was rather
weak, with a ﬁscal rule index value of around 2. According to our predictions,
the strengthening of their ﬁscal governance framework to the average level
would have allowed a decline in the risk premium for Irish sovereign bonds
by almost 100 basis points. Italy in turn had a rules-based ﬁscal governance
framework in place that was assigned a ﬁscal rule index value of 3.7, relatively
close to the average of 5, but it had a deﬁcit of 5.3 per cent and a public debt
level of 115 per cent of GDP in 2009. The enhancement of its rules-based ﬁscal
governance framework to the average level would still have yielded a reduction
of its sovereign risk premium by about 30 basis points. Finally, the gain from
such institutional improvement for Portugal - with a deﬁcit of 9.4 per cent
and public debt of 77 per cent in 2009 - would have been 50 basis points.
Our dataset permits the further study of the diﬀerent impact of speciﬁc char-
acteristics of rules-based ﬁscal governance on sovereign spreads. As described
in section 3, the ﬁscal rules index is a composite of 5 diﬀerent dimensions of
rules capturing (1) their legal base, (2) the room for setting or revising objec-
tives, (3) the nature of the body that is monitoring compliance with the rule,
(4) the enforcement mechanisms and (5) the media visibility of the rule. We
study the relevance of these dimensions by performing separate regressions for
each of the diﬀerent sub-indices of the rule in turn, also presenting a regression
with all sub-indices included simultaneously.
Table 2 shows these estimation results. Only for three sub-indices do we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant eﬀect. The largest eﬀect is found for the legal base of the na-
tional ﬁscal rule. A rule that is enshrined in the constitution will be perceived
by markets to be highly eﬀective; strengthening the legal dimension will thus
have a strong and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on sovereign bond spreads. We also
ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant and strong eﬀect of the legal enforcement possibilities
attached to the rules. Finally, we also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and strong eﬀect of
the media visibility of the rule. In contrast, the nature of the body in charge
of monitoring compliance with the rules as well as the room for setting or re-
vising objectives are not found to be signiﬁcant determinants of the sovereign
bond spread. Moreover, we perform a regression in which we include all ﬁve
sub-indices simultaneously. This regression suﬀers from the problem of a very
high correlation of the sub-indices. In this regression, only the media visibility
of the rules remains a signiﬁcant determinant of sovereign spreads.
17
A
B
C
D
E
F
d
eb
t
0
.0
2
∗∗
0
.0
2
∗
0
.0
2
∗
0
.0
2
∗
0
.0
2
∗
0
.0
1
−(
0
.0
1
)
−(
0
.0
1
)
−(
0
.0
1
)
−(
0
.0
1
)
−(
0
.0
1
)
−(
0
.0
1
)
ba
la
n
ce
−0
.1
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
7
∗∗
∗
−(
0
.0
5
)
−(
0
.0
5
)
−(
0
.0
5
)
−(
0
.0
5
)
−(
0
.0
4
)
−(
0
.0
5
)
ln
_
r
is
k
a
v
0
.9
1
∗∗
∗
0
.8
6
∗∗
∗
0
.9
0
∗∗
∗
0
.8
5
∗∗
∗
0
.8
8
∗∗
∗
0
.8
2
∗∗
∗
−(
0
.1
4
)
−(
0
.1
4
)
−(
0
.1
4
)
−(
0
.1
2
)
−(
0
.1
5
)
−(
0
.1
6
)
y
ie
ld
_
d
e
1
.0
2
∗∗
∗
1
.0
4
∗∗
∗
1
.0
5
∗∗
∗
0
.9
9
∗∗
∗
1
.0
1
∗∗
∗
0
.9
4
∗∗
∗
−(
0
.2
5
)
−(
0
.2
7
)
−(
0
.2
6
)
−(
0
.2
7
)
−(
0
.2
2
)
−(
0
.2
1
)
f
r
i_
1
−0
.2
3
∗∗
−0
.1
1
−(
0
.0
9
)
−(
0
.4
3
)
f
r
i_
2
−0
.1
3
0
.0
6
−(
0
.1
2
)
−(
0
.1
9
)
f
r
i_
3
−0
.1
2
0
.2
0
−(
0
.1
0
)
−(
0
.3
8
)
f
r
i_
4
−0
.1
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
4
−(
0
.0
5
)
−(
0
.1
8
)
f
r
i_
5
−0
.2
0
∗∗
−0
.2
4
∗
−(
0
.0
9
)
−(
0
.1
3
)
L
.l
n
_
sp
r
ea
d
0
.1
9
0
.2
6
0
.2
2
0
.2
2
0
.2
4
0
.2
6
−(
0
.1
6
)
−(
0
.1
8
)
−(
0
.1
6
)
−(
0
.1
7
)
−(
0
.1
8
)
−(
0
.1
8
)
L
2
.l
n
_
sp
r
ea
d
−0
.4
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.4
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.4
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
2
∗∗
−(
0
.0
8
)
−(
0
.0
7
)
−(
0
.0
8
)
−(
0
.0
8
)
−(
0
.1
0
)
−(
0
.1
2
)
N
=
6
6
y
ea
rs
:
1
9
9
9
−
2
0
0
9
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
∗ ,
∗∗
,
∗∗
∗
d
en
o
te
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
a
t
1
0
,
5
,
1
p
er
ce
n
t
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
T
ab
le
2:
E
st
im
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s:
ﬁ
sc
al
ru
le
su
b
-i
n
d
ic
es
18
The economic literature on determinants of sovereigns spreads is typically
based on reduced form analysis, without estimating equations directly derived
from a structural model. For the sake of comparability, below we also present
estimation results from this more standard approach. This exercise also serves
as a conﬁrmation of our results presented above. We speciﬁcally estimate the
following reduced form equation and its variants with further control variables:
spread ′i,t = β1risk t + β2balance
′
i,t + β3risk tbalance
′
i,t + β4debt
′
i,t
+ β5risk tdebt
′
i,t + β6fri
′
i,t + β7risk tfri
′
i,t + C
′
i + u
′
i,t, (9)
where debt′, balance′ and fri′ are considered to determine the probability of
default in deviation to the benchmark country, Germany, and risk - the US
corporate bond spread -measures investors' risk aversion. The spread is con-
sidered to be determined by the risk of default and interaction terms between
risk aversion and the other variables that allows capturing the possibility that
spreads react diﬀerently to fundamentals depending on the state of risk aver-
sion. The estimating equation contains country ﬁxed eﬀects c that capture
the eﬀect of time-invariant institutional factors; while u′i,t is an error term
with standard properties. Variables employed in additional speciﬁcations are
bid-ask spreads of the respective government bonds to control for the risk that
assets cannot be sold quickly; the size of the banking sector in the economy
to account for contingent liabilities that might draw on public budgets in the
event of bank failures, and the three-year projection of deﬁcits obtained from
the Stability and Convergence Programmes of the EU members to consider
the role that ﬁscal policy expectations might play separately from the room
for manoeuvre allowed for by the rules-based governance framework.
Table 3 shows the results of our reduced form regression analysis of the de-
terminants of government bond spreads in the euro area. The results conﬁrm
the important role of ﬁscal rules for sovereign risk premia in the euro area.
Fiscal rules do not have a signiﬁcant explanatory role regarding sovereign
bond yields as such (regression A). However, they are highly relevant when
investors become risk averse (regressions B to E). When global risk aversion
increases, countries with better ﬁscal rules witness lower increases of sovereign
bond yields relative to Germany. Also quantitatively, the results show a sim-
ilar order of magnitude as in the model-based estimations shown above, as
illustrated by Figure 5 as well. We also ﬁnd that a higher ratio of general
government debt to GDP signiﬁcantly enhances sovereign bond yields, as do
higher general government budget deﬁcits.
In line with previous research, we ﬁnd that international risk aversion is an
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important driver of sovereign bond spreads in the euro area itself. When con-
trolling for diﬀerences in liquidity across bond markets by including bid-ask
spreads (available as of 2003) among the regressors, we continue to ﬁnd that
ﬁscal rules play a signiﬁcant role (regressions F and G). Regression H addresses
the fact that in many countries the quality of ﬁscal rules does not change of-
ten: the ﬁscal rule index might pick up other non-observable time-constant
factors in these cases. We control for unobservable time-invariant factors that
are evaluated diﬀerently at diﬀerent levels of risk aversion with country ﬁxed
eﬀects in interaction with risk along with the country eﬀects in levels. Our
ﬁndings on ﬁscal rules are preserved in this highly ﬂexible speciﬁcation.
−15
−10
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0
5
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Fig. 5: Marginal eﬀect on ﬁscal rules on sovereign spreads (table 3, model D)
Regressions I and J omit the year 2009, thereby rendering the regression ro-
bust to special eﬀects related to the economic and ﬁnancial crisis. As argued
above, here we can safely consider the quality of rules-based ﬁscal governance
exogenous with respect to government bond yields and their spreads. Qualita-
tively, the diﬀerence to the main speciﬁcations presented above is that deﬁcits
and debt do not have diﬀerent impacts on sovereign spreads at diﬀerent levels
of risk aversion. Regression K addresses the role of the banking sector and
its potential liabilities to public budgets in the economic and ﬁnancial crisis
by controlling for the size of the aggregate bank assets as a proportion of
GDP (relative to Germany). This variable is insigniﬁcant; our central results
regarding the importance of national ﬁscal rules for containing sovereign bond
yields are again conﬁrmed.
Finally, to rule out the possibility that our ﬁscal rule index is just a proxy
of expectations on the ﬁscal policy stance but does not shape these, we con-
trol for the three year projection of deﬁcits obtained from the Stability and
Convergence Programmes of the EU members (regression L). Deﬁcit forecasts
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are found to be a signiﬁcant and quantitatively important determinant of gov-
ernment bond spreads, while our main results remain in place. This implies
that rules-based ﬁscal governance has an important role for the formation of
ﬁscal policy expectations by ﬁnancial markets beyond short-term expectations
embodied in forecasts.
5 Conclusion
The present paper shows the importance of rules-based national ﬁscal gover-
nance for the assessment of sovereign risk by ﬁnancial markets in the euro area.
Stronger ﬁscal rules turn out to be of great importance to contain sovereign
bond spreads in times of elevated market uncertainty in particular. Better ﬁs-
cal rules can reduce sovereign bond spreads between euro area member states
and Germany by 100 basis points and more, depending on global risk aver-
sion and country-speciﬁc ﬁscal fundamentals. Of particular importance is the
strength of the legal base of the ﬁscal rules in force as well as the enforcement
mechanisms. Our results are robust to the length of the time period and the
measurement of international risk aversion.
According to our model, national ﬁscal rules exert their beneﬁcial eﬀect on
sovereign spreads by reducing the probability of sovereign default, because
they correct for the deﬁcit bias and reduce the likelihood of large deﬁcits that
might threaten ﬁscal sustainability. These factors aﬀect expectations of future
ﬁscal outcomes and are especially important in times of higher risk aversion;
they come on top of the fact that past realisations of ﬁscal variables are bet-
ter on average in countries with stronger rules-based ﬁscal governance, which
again reduces the cost of debt. Overall, our results lend strong empirical sup-
port for the strengthening of national rules-based ﬁscal governance as part
of the European economic governance reform agenda. Ultimately it is clear,
however, that numerical ﬁscal rules can only operate as constraints to ﬁscal
policy to the extent that there is commitment to comply with them. In this
sense, our research conﬁrms that the existing rules are considered credible de-
vices of governments' commitment to ﬁscal discipline. Fiscal rules introduced
in the future, possibly under external pressure, will be the more eﬀective the
stronger the political determination and broader support of society are for the
pursuit of ﬁscal discipline.
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Appendix A Scores assigned to characteristics of ﬁscal rules
Dimension 1 (fri_1): Legal base of the rule
4 the rule is established by the constitution
3 the rule is based on a legal act (e.g. public ﬁnance act, ﬁscal responsibility
law)
2 the rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement reached by
diﬀerent general government tiers, but not enshrined in a legal act
1 political commitment by a given authority (central/local government,
minister of ﬁnance)
Dimension 2 (fri_2): Room for setting or revising objectives
3 there is no margin for adjusting objectives: they are encapsulated in the
document underpinning the rule
2 there is some but constrained margin in setting or adjusting objectives
1 there is complete freedom in setting objectives: the statutory base of the
rule merely contains broad principles or the obligation for the government
or the relevant authority to set targets
Dimension 3 (fri_3): Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect
and enforcement of the rule
The score of this criterion is constructed as a simple average of the two
elements below:
Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule
3 monitoring by an independent authority (ﬁscal council, court of auditors
or any other court) or the parliament
2 monitoring by the ministry of ﬁnance or any other government body
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1 no regular public monitoring of the rule (no report systematically assess-
ing compliance)
The score of this sub-criterion is augmented by 1 if there is real time mon-
itoring of compliance with the rule, i.e. if alert mechanisms of risk of non-
respect exist.
Nature of the body in charge of enforcing compliance with the rule
3 enforcement by an independent authority (ﬁscal council or court) or the
parliament
2 enforcement by the ministry of ﬁnance or other government body
1 no speciﬁc body in charge of enforcement
Dimension 4 (fri_4): Enforcement mechanisms of the rule
3 there are automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-
compliance item there is an automatic correction mechanism in case of
non-compliance and the possibility of imposing sanctions
2 the authority responsible is obliged to take corrective measures in case of
non-compliance or is obliged to present corrective proposals to Parliament
or the relevant authority
1 there is no ex-ante deﬁned actions in case of non-compliance
The score of this dimension is augmented by 1 if escape clauses are foreseen
and clearly speciﬁed.
Dimension 5 (fri_5) : Media visibility of the rule
3 observance of the rule is closely monitored by the media; non-compliance
is likely to trigger public debate
2 high media interest in compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to in-
voke public debate
1 no or modest interest of the media
Appendix B Additional tables
fri fri_1 fri_2 fri_3 fri_4
fri_1 0.95 1.00
fri_2 0.97 0.91 1.00
fri_3 0.97 0.90 0.95 1.00
fri_4 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.84 1.00
fri_5 0.93 0.84 0.86 0.93 0.80
Table A: Correlation across the components of the ﬁscal rule index
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ln_spread yield_de debt balance fri
yield_de 0.10 (0.29) 1.00
debt 0.43 (0.00) −0.07 0.48) 1.00
balance −0.52 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) −0.46 (0.00) 1.00
fri −0.37 (0.00) −0.07 (0.45) −0.34 (0.00) −0.40 (0.00) 1.00
ln_riskav 0.79 (0.00) 0.02 (0.84) 0.09 (0.38) −0.34 (0.00) −0.04 (0.69)
p-values in parentheses.
Table B: Correlation across variables employed in the analysis, 1999 to 2009
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